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"Poverty, Inequality, and Development:, Alleviation or Exacerbation?" 
Gary S. Fields 
ABSTRACT 
This paper shows that both in theory and in practice the choice 
of a relative inequality or absolute poverty measure of income distri­
bution may make an important qualitative difference in assessing whether 
economic development is benefiting the poor. If one is primarily con­
cerned with the alleviation of absolute poverty, it does not seem de­
sirable to use relative inequality indices. To the contrary, it is 
more appropropriate to use absolute poverty measures such as the number 
of individuals or families with incomes below a constant real poverty 
line or the average gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty 
line. Depending on the type of measure used, the results can look very 
different. 
Inequality and poverty measures are found to disagree qualitatively 
in Brazil and India, but not in Taiwan. The Taiwan result is due to 
a combination of favorable outcomes: (i) The rapid growth of the economy 
and (ii) The decline in relative inequality. Taiwan's poor received a 
larger fraction of a larger total, so their absolute incomes unambiguously 
rose. Brazil, in contrast, satisfied (i) but not (ii), i.e., relative 
inequality increased in a rapidly-growing economy. The growth of income 
more than offset rising inequality, though, leading to higher absolute 
incomes for the poor. In India, however, neither (i) nor (ii) held, 
which may perhaps explain the majority of studies which show rising 
absolute poverty ~espite constant relative inequality. 
One might speculate that these case studies represent a more general 
relationship between the rate of growth, the nature of growth, and the 
alleviation of poverty: rapid growth seems to reduce poverty unless 
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inequality is greatly exacerbated, but poverty is not likely to diminish 
when growth is lacking, at least within the existing economic order in 
a given country and in the absence of major (if not revolutionary) 
structural change. For most economies distributional rules are more or 
less fixed. From this, it follows that the economic position of the 
poor will be enhanced only when there is more to divide. The contrast 
between Taiwan and India is all too apparent. Alas, non-growth and 
non-alleviarton of poverty seem to go hand in hand unless a far-reaching 
decision is made to change the rules for dividing assets, rewarding 
producti\re' factors, and distributing society's goods and services. One 
dimension ~f that choice is the evenness or unevenness of the growth 
strategy p~rsued. In this respect, the three countries discussed above 
differ importantly. 
Taiwaa is reputed to have followed an unusually broadly-based growth 
path, improving the lot of large segments of the rural poor, encouraging 
small-scale industry, etc. India's non-growth was even too, the economic 
lot of the poor rising and falling with the weather and other external 
conditions. In contrast, Brazilian growth seens to have affected rela­
tively few: employment in the modern sector and other relatively favor­
able occupations expanded, but only a small proportion of the labor force 
was involved. However, major sectors went nowhere: rural workers' wages 
and the urban minimum wage did not rise and whole regions remained under­
developed. Perhaps future research will determine if the evenness of 
growth as well as the rate of growth are systematically related to the 
rate of alleviation of poverty and, if such a pattern is found, why. 
At issue is a very basic point: what is the ultimate aim of economic 
development studies? I would suggest this question: what combinations 
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of circumstances and policies lead some countries to upgrade the economic 
positions of their poor at faster rates than others? The viewpoint 
expressed in this paper is that studying the magnitudes and structure 
of absolute incomes and poverty may be the best way of finding out 
the answers. 
Note: This paper was prepared for the Conference on Distribution, Poverty, 
and Development, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, June 1977. 
The research for the paper was conducted at the Economic Growth Center, 
Yale University, and Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico, 
Universidad de Los Andes. Partial support for this research was re­
ceived from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
under RP0/284 and from the United States Agency for International 
Development under Order No. AID/otr-147-77-4. However, the views 
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of IBRD or USAID. I wish 
to thank the above institutions without implicating them. The helpful
research assistance of Farrukh Iqbal and Judith Oder is gratefully
acknowledged. 
"Among our century's most urgent problems is the wholly unacceptable 
poverty that blights the lives of some 2,000 million people in the more 
than 100 countries of the developing world. Of these 2,000 million, near­
ly 800 million are caught up in what can only be termed absolute poverty--­
a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential 
of the genes with which they were born; a condition of life so degrading 
as to be an insult to human dignity." 
Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank 
A central concern among development economists is to gain an under­
standing of the determinants of poverty and inequality so as to effect 
their alleviation. Poverty and inequality in less developed countries 
(LDCs) have been studied in a number of different ways: constructing 
poverty profiles, estimating income-or earnings-generating functions, 
calculating Gini coefficients or other measures of inequality, accounting 
for inequality by decomposition analysis, figuring the inequality of incomes 
received from different functional sources, and computing inequality among 
various economic sectors or regions. This paper deals with one of these 
problems---that of measuring the extent of countries' progress toward the 
alleviation of poverty in the course of their economic development. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I presents alternative 
ways of measuring improvement over time in income distribution. Section 
II gives empirical evidence for a number of less developed countries, illus­
trating similarities and differences between the different measurement pro­
cedures. Section III summarizes the results and explores their implications 
for future studies of economic development. 
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I. Alternative Approaches to the Study of the Size Distribution of Income 
A. Income as an Indicator of Economic Well-being 
The maintained assumption of this paper (and of many other studies of 
less developed countries) is that income is a suitable indicator of economic 
well-being. In many countries, household surveys and population censuses 
yield information on the distribution of annual or monthly income. While 
current income is not an ideal measure of economic welfare, it is a close 
proxy for many families. Where available, supplementary data on wealth, 
housing conditions, infant mortality and other economic indicators are use­
ful adjuncts to information on the size distribution of income. 
It is probably safe to assert that economic well-being is closely re­
lated to the goods and services one consumes. This consumption, in most 
cases, depends monotonically and very nearly dollar-for-dollar on income. 
Hence, the central role of income distribution as a measure of economic 
position. It is easy to think of exceptions to these generalizations: the 
cripple who derives less satisfaction from goods and services than the for­
tunate among us who are well-endowed physically, the young couple receiving 
large and frequent gifts from their parents, the rich with large asset 
holdings who finance their consumption out of their wealth rather than from 
their earnings, and the peasant family which grows and consumes its own 
food and has little or no cash income deriving from the sale of a marketable 
surplus. In all these cases, cash income is an inaccurate measure of the 
individual's or family's command over economic resources. At issue is the 
severity of the inaccuracies, since some are undoubtedly more worrisome 
than others. 
We should remember that the goal of many income distribution studies 
in less developed countries, including the present paper, is to assess 
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progress toward the alleviation of poverty and, more generally, to learn 
how the benefits of economic development are distributed. In other words, 
we want to assess changes in income distribution within a country over 
time. In time series comparisons, wh~tever biases and limitations there 
are in our data at one time may reappear the next time. If so, changes 
in current income are likely to parallel the changes in the "ideal" dis-
tribution of income. 1 This is not to say that more refined and better 
data are not of great importance, for indeed they are. What I mean to 
be arguing is that in the interim, in countries with comparable and reliable 
,income distribution data from household censuses and surveys, I think we 
would do better to look at the available information to measure 
that country's progress rather than to look at nothing at all. Let us now 
explore the principal approaches to the study of income distribution. 
B. Income Distribution and Income Inequality 
Despite popular parlance and practice, "income distribution" is not 
the same thing as "income equality (or inequality)." In a well-known book 
on the subject, Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 27) writes: "By personal distri-
bution we mean division of income (or wealth) by size, or more precisely, 
by size brackets of the income or wealth of economic units." [Emphasis 
in the original.] Later on (p. 43), he carefully distinguishes between 
the personal distribution of income and statistics such as the coefficient 
of variation which "measure the degree of inequality of a personal income 
1
Note that this argument is made for the specific purpose of intra-
country time series comparisons. For other purposes, such as international 
cross-section comparisons, the biases and limitations are more serious, 
rendering such comparisons tenuous. 
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distribution." [Emphasis added] 1 
To illustrate the distinction between "income distribution" and "income 
inequality", consider the simple case of two countries, one of which has 
twice as much income as the other and that extra income is distributed 
proportionately over the population. For example, in two ten-person 
economies: 
YA= (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
YB= (2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20). 
Are the income distributions in A and B the same or different? Economists 
answer the question ambiguously. On the one hand, the entire income distri­
bution is in a different position---everyone in B has twice as much income 
as in A, and the total is twice as high too. So in one sense the income 
distribution is different. On the other hand, in each country, the poorest 
person's income is 10% of the richest person's, the second poorest's 20%, 
and so on. So in another sense, the distribution of income is the same. 
This example gets at the difference between the distribution of income and 
relative inequalitz in the distribution of income. In our example, I would 
prefer to say that absolute income distribution changed and relative inequality 
did not. In the remainder of the paper, the terms "income distribution" and 
"income equality (or inequality) "will be used accordingly. 
It is insightful to contrast the way we usually think about income dis­
tribution from the way we are accustomed to think about the distribution 
of other economic or social magnitudes, for example, the distribution of 
education. For education, our concern is how many people have attained what level. 
1The distinction here is just like the difference in elementary economics 
between the definition of a multiplier (namely, the change in national income 
which results from a given exogenous change in a particular economic variable) 
and one measure of the multiplier (the reciprocal of the marginal propensity 
to save). 
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If a larger fraction of the population achieves literacy, let us say, 
we are inclined to regard that country's education system as having done 
"better". In making such a judgment, we usually do not think to ask 
whether more people had also completed university; nor do we compute a 
statistical measure of inequality of educational attainments, such as the 
variance or a Gini coefficient. Rather, our strategy is to pinpoint a 
target group whose upgrading we care most about and then to measure the 
rate of absolute improvement among that target group. 
In studies of income distribution, the approach is ordinarily quite 
different. Most studies ask: "Did income distribution worsen?" Typically, 
that question is answered by examining either (i) how the income shares of 
particular deciles (or other groupings) changed, (ii) how the Lorenz curve 
shifted, or (iii) whether measures such as Gini coefficients, variance of 
incomes or their logarithms, etc. exhibit greater or lesser inequality. 
All these are relative inequality measures. In effect, then, by beginning 
with relative inequality measures rather than with absolute levels, the 
approach to studies of the distribution of income reverses the approach 
to studies of the distribution of other economic and social goods. 
Let us now examine their various approaches to the study of income 
distribution in some detail. 
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C. Relative Inequality Approach 
In most studies of income distribution in less developed countries, 
the income distribution measure under consideration is relative income in-
equality. Relative inequality is conveniently illustrated by a Lorenz 
curve as shown in Figure 1. The Lorenz curve depicts the income share 
of any cumulative percentage of the population, ordered from lowest income 
to highest. All relative inequality measures in current use are based on 
the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient, being most directly related, is 
the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line (area A in 
Figure 1) to the total area (A+B). The Gini coefficient thus varies between 
zero and one, and the higher the coefficient, the greater the degree of 
relative inequality. The fractile measures 
in common use, such as the income share of the poorest 40% or richest 10%, 
can also be read directly from the Lorenz curve. Finally, there is a class 
of relative inequality Measures whicl1 may be calculated from the data con­
tained in Lorenz curves. These include many familiar indices such as the 
variance (or standard deviation) of income or its logarithm, the coefficient 
of variation, Kuznets ratio, Atkin~on index, Theil index, and many others. 
1 
In using one or more of these inequality measures, the judgment is 
typically made that social welfare (W) depends positively on the level 
of national income (Y) and negatively on the inequality in the 
distribution of that income (I). For example, taking the share of income 
r'of the poorest 40% of the population (S) as an index of equality and the 
Cini coefficient (G) as an index of inequality, these studjes would hold that 
1
Many references are avai1..-1ble which give definitions and descriptions








% of population 
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Wis positively related to Yand 
sand negatively related to G. 
1 
The terminology of these studies is indicative---falling Sor rising G 
are given the non-neutral term "worsening of the income distribution," a nd 
it is generally thought to be a bad thing when rising measured inequality 
is encountered. 
Let us consider a simple hypothetical numerical example showing how 
these judgments are brought to bear in p~actice: 
Example One. 
Country 
Share of Lowest 40%: Cini Coefficient:Rate of Growth Level % Change Level % Change 
Both countries
initially .363 .082 
Country A
later 11% .333 - 8% .133 +62% 
Country B
later 22% .307 -15% .162 +97% 
Country B grew twice as fast as country A. However, relative income inequality
as measured by the Cini coefficient and income share of the lowest 40%, seems to be
"worse" in country B than in country A; that is, it would appear that the 
rich benefited at the expense of the poor, whose relative income share 
deteriorated. A development economist might question whether the higher 
rate of growth in country B was "worth it" in terms of income di:::;tribution,
and a well-meaning development planner seeking to give very high weight to
alleviation of inequality might go so far as to choose country A's policies
over country B's. ., 





D. Absolute Poverty Approach 
Now, let us consider another approach which looks directly at a 
1country's progress in alleviating poverty among the very poorest. We 
must first define what we mean by "poverty." Suppose we can agree that 
an individual is poor if his or her income falls below a specified dollar 
amount, with analogous figures for families of different sizes. The 
United States Agency for International Development, for example, makes 
use of the figure of U.S. $150 per capita in less developed countries; 2 
the World B~nk uses $50 or $75. 3 In other countries, the poverty line 
is set with respect to minimal nutritional adequacy. 4 Let us arbitrarily 
choose one of these figures as a poverty line and agree to hold it constant 
·in rea1 terms. Denote t he povert y line by P* . "The poor" are those whose 
incomes are less than P*. 
Most observers would share the following judgments about the extent of 
poverty (P): 
(i) P is negatively related to the number of income recipients with 
incomes below the poverty line P*. 
(ii) The larger is the average income of those below the poverty line, 
the lower is P. 
(iii) Other things unchanged, the more unequal the distribution of income among 
the poor, the more severe is P. 
1 
Absolute income studies of less developed countries are the exception 
rather than the rule. Economists at the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, have been taking an absolute income approach for some 
time; see International Labour Office (1970). More recently, tl1e World Bank 
has begun to shift its focus as well; see Ahluwalia (1974). These studies 
are noteworthy precisely because they do differ from the usual approach. 
2
See A.I.D. (1975). 
3
See Ahluwalia (1974). 
4
For example, Ojha (1970) and Webb (1976). 
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In most studies, measures eatering into these three judgments are computed
) 
separately. However, in a paper just published, Sen (1976) combines these 
measures and argues elegantly for the use of a composite index. 1 
Absolute poverty measures like those just presented have been used in 
research in the United States for many years; see, for example, Bowman (1973) 
or Perlman (1976). The main advantage of absolute poverty indices is that 
they provide direct measures of changes in the number of poor and the extent 
of poverty among them. Note, in contrast, that although poverty indicators 
can be computed from Lorenz curves or Lorenz curve-based inequality measures, 
this information is obtained only indirectly and often with considerable 
computational difficulty. 
To see how the absolute poverty approach is applied, consider now 
another numerical example for a given country in an early and a later stage 
of its economic development. Assume the following hypothetical figures, 
where the poverty line is somewhere between $1 and $2: 
1
The index recommended by Sen is 
n = H[i + (1-l)G ],
p 
where H = head count of the poor (i.e., how many there are), 
I = average income short fall of the poor (i.e. , the gap between p,'; 
and the average income of those below P~'t), and 
Gp= Cini coefficient of income inequality arno~g the poor. 
Thus, alternative specifications of the absolute poverty approach are1 
(a) W = f (H) , f' < o, 
(b) w = g (I) g' < 0, 
(c) w = h(n), where n = 11[1 + (1-l)G p ], h' < o. 
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Example Two. 
Percentage of Labor Force in: 
Rate of Growth of Modern 
High Wage Jobs Low Wage Jobs Sector ("Modern Sector 
Country (Real Wage= 2) (Real Wage= 1) Labor Absorption Rate") 
Both countries 
initially 
Country Clater 20% 80% 100% 
Country D later 30% 70% 200% 
In both countries, the poor received the benefits of growth; but in country 
D, twice as many poor benefited. 0ther things equal, development economists 
would almost certainly rate country Das superior, and development planners 
would seek to find out what had brought about that country's favorable 
experience and adopt those policies in their own countries. In this second 
example, the preference is clear-cut, while in the previous example, the 
issue was open to doubt. 
E. Relative Poverty Approach 
The relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches are the two 
main ways in which distributional aspects of economic development have been 
considered. In addition, there is now a newer approach being promulgated 
by researchers at the World Bank and elsewhere known as the relative poverty 
measure. 1 This figure is the absolute income (in constant dollars) received 
by the poorest 40% of the population. 
2 
Consider now a third example: 
. 
. . Example Three • 
~ountry _ Absolute Income of Poorest 40% of Population 
Both countries 
initially $40 
Country Elater $40 
Country Flater $40 
1Sec, for example, Chiswick (1976). 
2rhe choice of poorest 40% is purely arbitrary. What matters in this approa, 
is the constancy of population share along with income variability among them. 
-12-
Using the relative poverty measure, it appears that there was no improvement 
in absolute income of the poorest 40% in either case. One might ask: why 
grow if the poor do not share in the benefits of growth? In this third 
example, E and F both seem to have failed to alleviate poverty. 
F. Comparison of the Three Approaches 
In point of fact, countries A, C, and E are the same country, and 
Real-world economic developmentcountries B, D, and F the same country! 
histories and policy projections are often presented in these different 
ways. Yet, as these examples make clear, how income distribution is studied--~ 
whether in terms of relative income inequality (as in example one), absolute 
incomes and poverty (example two), or relative poverty (example three)---
may dramatically influence our perceptions of the outcome. 
have encountered the following differences.Specifically, in our examples, we 
According to the absolute poverty criterion, B-D-F clearly dominates A-C-E 
on both growth and distribution grounds. Using the relative 
inequality criterion, it is difficult to judge; although B-D-F grew faster 
than A-C-E, inequality seems to have worsened.
1 Finally by the 
relative poverty criterion, both appear equally unsatisfactory, since neither 
country seems to have made progress in alleviating poverty; in fact, poverty 
was being alleviated in both, and at different rates. 
To my mind, the failure of the relative poverty meas\ire to record an 
income distribution change is worse than troublesome. These. countries were 
is totally insensitivealleviating poverty, yet the relative poverty measure 
1 
Whether inequality really worsened, even in relative terms, is 
not entirely obvious, when one loolrn at the absolute figures presented in 
Example 'fwo. The possi.bility that the usual relative inequality measures 
may not be satisfactory even for making relative inequality judgments in tl1is 
type of growth is dealt with further in Fields (1976 ). 
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to this. On this basis, I would conclude that relative poverty measures 
are unsuited for gauging the distributional consequences of this type of 
growth. Hence, I will ignore the relative poverty measure subsequently. 
Note that the difficulties with the relative poverty measure arise 
in cross sectional data, where we look at those who are the poorest 40% 
ex post at different times (i.e., disregarding the movement of specific 
individuals into and out of the poorest 40%). If we had longitudinal data, 
and were able to trace the progress of those individuals who 
were the poorest 40% ex ante, the problem 
would not arise. This is because their average income would be higher 
the faster the rate of modern sector enlargement gro~th. Unfortunately 
in the real world, we do not have longitudinal data, so the relative 
poverty approach has serious problems. 
G. Exploring the Choice Between the Relative Inequality and Absolute 
Poverty Approaches 
Concerning the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches, the 
discrepancy between the two is based in part on a legitimate difference in 
value judgments, in part on a statistical pattern which in some respects 
is artifactual. Let us explore these discrepancies further and ask: 
(1) What is it about the process of economic development that produces 
a discrepancy between the different approaches? 
(2) In assessing the distributional consequences of growth, do we wish 
to give greater weight in our judgments to the allevation of absolute poverty 
or to the narrowing of relative income inequality? 
The answer to the first question is that the discrepancy is produced by 
the unevenness of economic development itself. The pattern depicted exempli­
fies what I call "modern sector enlargement growth," which takes place when 
an economy grows by enlarging the size of its modern sector, the incomes (or 
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wages) within the modern and traditional sectors remaining the same. The 
discrepancy arises because this type of growth affects only some of the 
poor, not all. Consequently, those whose situations are not improved by 
this type of growth, and who therefore remain as poor as before, receive 
the same dollar amount, but it is a smaller part of a larger whole. From 
this, it follows that: (1) the absolute incomes of the poorest 40% are 
unchanged, 1and (2) the Lorenz curve shifts downward at its lower end, 
and consequently those Lorenz-curve based measures of relative income in­
equality which are sensitive to the lower end of the income distribution 
register a "worsening" of the income distribution. 
We should note that "modern sector enlargement growth" is not just 
the figment of some ivory tower academician's imagination. This pattern 
is widely-regarded as an essential ingredient of development. In their 
famous book, Fei and Ranis (1964) wrote: " ••• the heart of the development 
problem may be said to lie in the gradual shifting of the center of gravity 
of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial sector ••• gauged in 
terms of the reallocation of the population between the two sectors in 
order to promote a gradual expansion of industrial employment and output." 
This characterization is echoed by Kuznets (1966). Empirical studies, such 
as that of Turnham (1971), have documented the absorption of an increasing 
share of the population into the modern sector as growth takes place. 
In a case study of Indian economic development in the 19SO's, Swamy (1967) 
found that 85% of the change in the size distribution of income was due to 
inter-sectoral factors (namely, growth in importance of the urban sector and 
growing per capita income differential between the urban and rural sectors) 
and only 15% to changing inequality within the two sectors. Thus, 
1observe that some persons who were originally in the poorest 40% are now 
in the high income sector and different individuals now comprise the poorest 
40%, but we cannot detect that movement in cross-sectional data (in which 
the sampling procedures are the same but different individuals are sampled). 
Longitudinal studies tracing the same individuals over time are needed, but 
this kind of data simply does not exist for a representative sample of the 
population in any less developed country. 
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modern sector enlargement comprises a large and perhaps even predominant 
) 
component of the growth of currently-developing countries. 
The other question posed above regards the choice between absolute 
and relative income measures in determining who does and does not receive 
the benefits of growth. The choice depends on basic ethical considerations, 
so let me be forthright about my own value judgments. For me, the plight 
of the poor in less developed countries is objective, to the extent that 
they do not have command over sufficient resources to feed and clothe them­
selves and avoid disease. Thus, to my mind, poverty is an absolute condition, 
requiring analysis in absolute terms! I would therefore give predominant 
emphasis to data on changes in the number poor, the average extent of their 
poverty, and the degree of inequality among them. 
Others have different concerns and make different judgments than I. 
They would give great weight to the subjective feelings of the poor who may 
feel relatively worse off if others' economic positions are improving and 
theirs are not. Observers who feel strongly about such relative income 
considerations are justified in using relative inequality measures. 
What may not be justified, and there are many examples of this in 
the development literature, is the coupling of a concern over the absolute 
economic misery of the poor with reliance on calculations of changes in 
relative inequality over time. I fear this approach may be mistaken and 
misleading, quite apart from its logical inconsistency. For just as in the 
numerical example above, by assigning heavy weight to changes in the 
usual indices of relative income inequality and interpreting these increases 
as offsets to the economic well-being brought about by growth, important 
tendencies toward the alleviation of absolute poverty may be overlooked. 
1
In richer countries like the United States, relative income comparisons 
may be more important, but my concern in the present paper is not with the U.S. 
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H. Conclusion 
This section ·has pointed out the types of issues involved in establishing 
an income distribution criterion for assessing the progress of less developed 
countries toward reducing poverty. As I understand the intent of most de­
velopment economists and planners, the primary goal of economic development, 
and of aid to that development, is to alleviate absolute poverty, and only 
secondarily to reduce relative inequality. If the alleviation of absolute 
poverty is the primary goal, and I agree that it should be, it seems logical 
to measure progress toward that goal directly using absolute poverty criteria, 
rather than indirectly by relativE: inequality or relative poverty indices. 
The numerical exampl~jof this section have shown how differences among the 
various approaches may arise. If students of economic development or policy­
makers use relative inequality meas.ures when they care most about absolute 
poverty, they may be misled~ 
Unfortunately, this is not just ldle speculation. Major differences 
arise between the different approaches in the actual experiences of several 
less developed countries. Some case studies are presented below. 
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II. Absolute Poverty Vs. Relative Inequality: Three Case Studies 
The bulk of the literature on income distribution in developing countries 
is based on the assumption that figures on relative income inequality pro­
vide suitable indicators of changes in economic position of the poor. 
As Section I demonstrated, we may instead approach the question of changing 
income distribution from an absolute poverty perspective. From this point 
of view, the relevant questions deal with the determinants of incomes in 
general and of poverty in particular and how the numbers in poverty and 
the determinants of poverty have changed over time. It should be obvious 
that the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches do not 
necessarily agree with one another in assessing the distributional con­
sequences of growth in a particular country. Whether they do or not is 
an empirical question. Three case studies are presented below. 
A. Brazil 
One of the most interesting and controversial cases of economic develop­
ment is that of Brazil. Over the decade of the 1960s, the real rate of 
ec~nomic growth was 79%. After allowing for a high population growth rate, 
real income per capita grew at 32% over the decade, a substantial achieve­
ment by LDC standards. For the latter years of the 1960s and the first 
part of the 1970s, Brazil experienced rates of growth approaching 10% per 
annum. On this basis, the Brazilian case was widely heralded as an 
"economic miracle." 
Then, a sudden cloud appeared on the horizon. In an exceptionally 
influential paper, Fishlow (1972) examined the distributional question of 
who received the benefits of this growth. Usinc the Cini coefficient of 
inequality and the.income shore received by the richest 3% of the population, 
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Fishlow observed a "worsening" of the relative income distribution during 
the 1960s despite the rapid economic growth of the latter years. A 
similar qualitative conclusion was reached subsequently by Adelman and 
Morris (1973, p. 1) based on the income share of the poorest 40%. Some 
of the data underlying these conclusions are presented in Table 1. 
The finding that income inequality in Brazil had become greater gave 
pause to many. As a result, there is now widespread disagreement about 
the desirability of.taking Brazilian economic and social policies as a 
model for other developing countries to follow. It is probably fair to 
say that, because of Fishlow's paper, the Brazilian experience is no longer 
regarded by most observers as "miraculous." 
It should also be noted that many economists in the field, although not 
Fishlow himself, inferred from this evidence that tfie growth which had taken 
place had been at the expense of the poor; see, for instance, Foxley (19 75). 
A softer inference from the Brazilian data is that the poor did not share 
in the benefits of Brazilian growth. I submit that both inferences are in-
correct and arise from the use of relative inequality rather than absolute 
poverty The conclusions which follow are drawn.from anothermeasures. 
paper [Fields (1977)], to which the reader is referred for additional 
details. 
I should begin by pointing out that my research used Fishlow's own 
data. I did not challenge any of the underlying numbers. To make absolute 
poverty comparisons, we need data on changes in the number of persons with 
incomes below a constant ~eal poverty line defined accordirig to Brazilian 
standards and the average incomes among them. 
1 
For this purpose, Fishlow's 
data do not quite suffice, since they are expressed in current rather than 
constant cruzeiros. Hence, exactly comparable figures cannot be calculated 
1Following Fishlow's precedent, I took the poverty line to be the 
minimum wage in the poorest region of the country (the Northeast). 
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TABLE 1 
DATA ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN BRAZIL 
1960 1970 
Gini Coefficient of 
Inequality, Total 
0.59 0.63Economically Active 
Populationa 
I 
Income Share of 
Richest 3.2%a 27% 33% 
Income Shar~ of b 
Poorest 40% (estimated) · 10% 8% 
a) Source: Fishlow (1972) 
b) Source: Adelman and Morris (1973). 
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from published sources, so an appro:xmiation is needed. I adopted a simple 
linear scheme. 
The derived data clearly demonstrate that the cumulative percentage 
of population was lower in 1970 than in 1960 for every income bracket, 
as may be seen in Figure 2. This means that the economic growth which 
took place in Brazil over the decade of the 1960's reached persons at all 
income levels, and not just those at the top. 
The finding that the absolute income distribution improved came as 
a surprise to me. To confirm its validity, I looked further. Some of 
my data are reported in Table 2. These data reveal that the percentage 
of the economically active population with incomes below the Brazilian 
poverty level declined during the decade, those who remained poor were 
less poor than before in real absolute terms, and the rate of growth of 
income among the poor was at least as great as the rate of growth among 
the non-poor. More precisely, my conclusions concerning the changes in 
income distribution in Brazil in the 1960s were: 
(1) The entire income distribution shifted in real terms, benefiting 
every income class. 
(2) There was a small decline in the fraction of the economically active 
population classified as below the poverty line, but those who remained 
"poor" experienced a marked percentage increase in real income. 
(3) The percentage increase for those below the poverty line was 
greater than the increase for those not in poverty, and may well have been 
twice as high or more. 
(4) The relative income gap between "poor" and "non-poor" persons 
narrowed in terms of ratios although the absolute gap widened. 
FIGll~E 2. BRAi:ILL\N SlZE DISTRUU1ION OF rnCCJl·lE, 19(,0 /J''.J J970 -21-
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TABLE 2 
SOME DATA ON ABSOLUTE INCOMES AND POVERTY IN BRAZIL, 
1960 AND 1970 
Percentage of economically active 
population with incomes below the 
poverty line 
Mean real income of the poor (NCr$ 1000) 
Mean real income of the non-poor 
Mean real income of the economically 
active population 
Income difference, non-poor minus poor 
lncome ratio, non-poor relative to poor 
Proportion reduction in poverty gap 


















(5) The bulk of the income growth over the decade accrued to persons 
above the poverty line. A similar pattern is observed for the United States, 
an allegedly more egalitarian society. 
(6) The poverty gap in Brazil was cut nearly in half between 1960 and 
1970.1 The United States reduced its poverty gap by the same percentage 
over the same decade. 
In summary, my reexamination of the income distribution data from Brazil 
showed that the poor in Brazil did benefit from the economic 
growth that took place during the 1960s. 2 In light of the rising Gini 
coefficients and income shares of the very rich, the finding that the same 
data are consistent with non-trivial improvements in the economic position 
of the poor is a startling one. However one regards the Brazilian model of 
development, emiseration of the poor was not one of its features. In 
this case, exclusive reliance on relative inequality comparisons led many 
to overlook important tendencies toward the allevation of absolute poverty. 
We shall consider the implications of the Brazilian findings further 
after reviewing changes in relative income and absolute poverty patterns in 
India and Taiwan, where the situations were quite different. 
1
The poverty gap is the total cumulative income shortfall of the poor,
i.e., the sum of the differences between each poor person's income and the 
poverty line. 
2
In stating this conclusion, I in no way wish to condone either the 
persistence of the severe poverty that remains, or the apparent lack of a 
strong commitment by the Brazilian authorities to alleviate the current 
plight of the poor in this generation, or some of the more authoritarian 
measures reputed to have been used to assure social stability. 
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B. India 
India is, of course, a very poor country which is growing very slowly. 1 
India offers abundant data on the distribution of income and consumption dating 
back to the 1950's. Given the richness of the data in so poor a country 
with so large a research 'establishment, it is not surprising that we find 
a multitude of income distribution studies. Some of the findings from 
some of the more important of these are reported in Table·3._ 
The data in Table 3 differ with respect to the concept of income or 
consumption employed, the procedures-by which the figures were derived, 
and the years for which the distributions were estimated. The remarkable 
feature about the relative inequality data is that no clear pattern of change 
emerges. More specifically: 
(1) Overall, as measured by the Gini coefficient, relative income 
2inequality shows no particular trend. 
(2) The Gini coefficient within the urban sector may have risen somewhat, 
suggesting greater inequality, but the evidence is mixed. 
(3) The Gini coefficient within the rural sector seems to have de­
clined, suggesting lesser inequality, but as with the urban Gini coefficient, 
no strong tendency is found. 
(4}Possibly,. th~ income share of the bottom 20% rose and the share of 
the top 20% fell nationwide, together suggesting diminished inequality, 
but both changes are small. 
1 Per capita income is under $100. During the 1960's, per capita private 
consumer expenditure grew by less than 1/2 % per annum; see Dandekar and 
Rath (1971, p. 40). 
2 Since Lorenz curves crossed, other relative inequality measures would 
probably have yielded similarly inconclusive results. 
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE INCOME INEQUALITY IN INDIA, 
VARIOUS YEARS AND STUDIES 
A. Study by Bhatty (1974) -- Data from NCAER 
Year 
Income Distribution Measure 1961-62 1964-65 1967-68 1968-69 
..: 
Gini Coefficient of Household 
Income Distribution, Rural India 0.41 0.35 0.46 0.43 
B. Study by Ojha-Bhatt (1974) Data from NSS and National Accounts 
Year 
Income Distribution Measure 1953-55 1963-65 
Share in Personal Disposable Income 
Bottom 20% 7% 7% 
Top 20% 50% 48% 
Gini Coefficient 
National 0.371 0.375 
Urban 0.392 0.448 
Rural 0.341 0.319 
C. Study by Ranadive (1973) -- Data from NSS and National Accounts 
Year 
Iocame Distribution Measure 1953-54 1961-62 
~ Share of Total Personal 
Disposable Income 
Bottom 20% - Estimate A 7.50% 7.80% 
Bottom 20% - Estimate B 7.20% 7.60% 
Top 207. - Estimate A 44.34% 45.47% 
Top 20% - Estimate B 45.89% 46.70% 
Gini Coefficient 
Rural 0.340 0.317 
Urban 0.453 0.487 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
D. Study by Ahmed and Bhattacharya 
Income Distribution Measure 




E. Study by Bardhan (1974) 
Income Distribution Measure 
Cini Coefficient of Common Exp. 
Rural 
Urban 
Source: Bardhan (1974). 
(1972) --










Data from NSS 
Year 














In summary, given the inconclusiveness of the individual findings, the 
contradictory indications as to whether inequality increased or decreased, 
and the small magnitudes of the changes as compared with probable errors 
in sampling and measurement, it appears warranted to conclude that the 
pattern of relative inequality in India remained essentially unchanged. 
A leading Indian economist, P.K. Bardhan, takes issue with relative 
inequality measurements of income distribution. He contends: "For a 
desparately poor country like India, there are many who believe that no 
measure of inequality which is in tenns of relative distribution and is 
1
independent of some absolute poverty standard can be entirely Satisfactory." 
Accordingly, he has calculated estimates of the percentage of the population 
below a constant absolute poverty line: Rs. 15 per capita per month at 
2
1960-61 prices in the rural sector, Rs. 18 in the urban sector. His 
1 Bardhan (1974 1 p. 119). 
2 
In Bardhan (1974, pp. 119-124), he describes how these poverty lines are 
computed. The minimally-adequate diet for a moderately active adult as recom­
mended by the Central Government Employees Pay Connnission consists of 15 oz. 
of cereals, 3 oz. of pulses, 4 oz. of milk, 1.5 oz. of sugar and RUr, 1.25 oz. 
of edible oils, 1 oz. of groundnut and 6 oz. of vegetables per day, totaling 
2100 calories and 55 grams of protein. To figure the family income required 
to achieve this diet, Bardhan works out the cost per adult, adjusts for 
family make-up by the adult-equivalent ratio, expands to a requisite family 
income figure using the ratio of food to non-food expenditures, divides by 
family size to obtain a per capita amount, anrl finally deflates by the 
official Agricultural Labour Consumer Price Index for the appropriate year for 
the rural poor and by the official Working Class Consumer Price Index for 
the urban poor. 
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results, shown in Part A of Table 4 are striking: Bardhan estimates that 
absolute poverty worsened greatly in lndia over the 1960's even though 
relative inequality did not. 1 Note p~rticularly the comparison with 
Bardhan's own relative inequality estimates in part E of Table 3~ ~-
Several other studies have also eati11ated absolute povertr changes in rural 
India. Bardhan's conclusion that absolute poverty increased 1- India 
during the 1960's was sustained in a paper by Ojha (1970) publuh~d con­
temporaneously with Bardhan's original work (1970). Defining poverty 
according to consumption of foodgrains rather than in rupees, Ojha found 
that the incidence of absolute rural poverty increased considerably between 
1960-61 and 1967-68 (see Part B of Table 4). Further corroboratimg evidence 
may be found in a study by Vaidyanath~n (1974), who estimated that real 
per capita consumption declined for each fractile group in rural population 
and the proportion below a constant absolute poverty line increas~d. (Part C). 
Before accepting the conclusion that absolute ~overty worsened in India 
in the 1960's, we should also take note of contradictory evidence presented 
by another eminent Indian economist, B.S. Minhas. In a 1970 study, Minhas 
reported a decline in absolute rural poverty (see Part D of Table 4). The 
discrepancies in the findings of the various studies are due to a number 
of methodological differences: the use of adjusted versus unadjusted con­
sumption data, application of different price deflators, and measurement 
of the poverty line at a different amount. It is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to attempt to resolve these differences.
2 
1Bardhan (1974, p. 131) notes: "The direction of change in the estimatesof poverty is the same if one takes the various alternative minimum standardsfor the poverty line suggested in the literature." (Emphasis in the original.)
2Readers seriously interested in knowing whether absolute poverty "really"increased or decreased in India may pursue the debate in greater detail. Inaddition to the studies mentioned above, for further bibliographic references,see Srinivasan and Bardhan (1974), Sarnia et. al (1975), and Sen (1976). 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATES OF ABSOLUTE POVERTY IN INDIA IN THE 1960's 
A. Study by Bardhan (1974) 1960-61 1964-65 1968-69 
Rural, percentage below 
Rs. 15 per capita per month* 
38% 45% 54% 
Urban, percentage below 
Rs. 18 per capita per month* 
32% 37% 41% 
B. Study by Ojha (1970) 1960-61 196 7-68 
Rural, percentage whose con-
sumption of foodgrains was 
below nutritional norms 
52% 70% 
c. Study by Vaidyanathan (1974) 1960-61 1964-65 196 7-68 
Rural per capita expenditure 
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per capita consumption below Rs. 
















































46% 39% 37% 
* In 1960-61 prices. 
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In summary, whether absolute poverty was alleviated or exacerbated 
in Indian economic development depends on which study you believe. For 
our purposes, the most important finding is that in India, as in Brazil, 
relative inequality measures are found to suggest one set of conclusions 
with respect to changing income distribution while absolute poverty com-
parisons suggest another. Interestingly, the nature of the discrepancy 
is exactly reversed: indications of more absolute poverty (or less, in 
the case of Minhas' study) despite apparently constant relative inequality 
in India, alleviation of absolute poverty despite rising relative inequality 
in Brazil. These discrepancies are disturbing indeed. 
C. Taiwan 
Unlike the cases of Brazil and India, when one analyzes recent Taiwanese 
experience from either a relative inequality or an absolute income per­
spective, the qualitative conclusion is the same: the poor shared in that 
country's economic development, their incomes increasing at an above-average 
rate. Data on Taiwanese income distribution are shown in Table 5. 
Row (1) of the table indicates that per household income nearly doubled 
in real terms between 1964 and 1972. This extraordinary achievement is 
well-known to development economists. Less well-known are the distributional 
aspects of that growth. These are reported in rows (2) - (5). We see in 
rows (2) and (3) that two measures of inequality---the Gini coefficient and 
the ratio of incomes of the top decile to the bottom decile---both declined, 
the latter more than the former. Other measures of inequality also show 
declining relative inequality over the period. 1 Rows (4) and (5) present 
the absolute real incomes of various decile groups. We see that the income 
1
Fei-Ranis-Kuo note that most of the change took place after 1968,
which marked the end of the labor surplus. 
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TABLE 5 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN TAIWAN, 1964 and 1972. 
1964 1972 
(1) Mean income per household 32.5 61.0 
at constant 1972 prices, 
measured in thousands of NT$ 
(2) Gini coefficient 0.328 0.301 
(3) Ratio of income share 
of top 10% to bottom 10% 8.6 6.8 
(4) Income share of poorest 20% 7. 7% 8.6% 
(5) Mean income at 1972 constant 
prices 
(in thousands of NT$): 
First decile (lowest) NT$ 9.9 ('000) NT$ 20.6 ( '000) 
Second II 15.2 30.2 
Third II 18.9 36.1 
Fourth II 22.0 41.1 
Fifth II 25.3 46.2 
Sixth II 28.5 52 .1, 
Seventh 11 32.9 59.6 
Eight fl 38.7 69.0 
Ninth fl 48.8 83.4 
Tenth II 84.5 128.8 
















Sources: Kuo(1975, Tables 5 and 6) and 
Fei-Ranis-Kuo (forthcoming, Diagram 1). 
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share of the poorest decile increased, which in a rapidly-growing economy 
implies even more rapidly-growing incomes among the very poorest. A 
comparison of the rates of growth of real incomes by decile grouping 
(row (5)) shows a clear pattern: highest rates of income growth at 
the lowest end of the income distribution. Thus, the poor in Taiwan 
did share substantially in that country's economic development, both 
absolute poverty and relative inequality declining. 
D. Conclusion 
This section has examined changing patterns of income inequality 
and poverty in three countries. The results exhibit some important 
differences. Data from Brazil suggest a "worsening" of the income distri­
bution, insofar as the Gini coefficient was noticeably higher in 1970 
as compared with 1960, the share of income received by the very richest 
rose, and by one estimate the share received by the very poorest may have 
fallen. However, using an explicitly poverty-oriented approach focusing 
on absolute rather than relative incomes, we find that the poor in Brazil 
do seem to have shared in economic development, albeit to a limited extent. 
Among other things, the percentage increase in income of those below a 
Brazilian poverty line was at least as great and possibly double the per­
centage increase of those above the line. 
In India, the situation is quite different. Relative income inequality 
did not change noticeably. Some observers have inferred from this that 
although India did not grow very fast it had at least "held the line" on 
income distribution. When the figures are re-examined from an absolute 
poverty perspective, we see that they did not hold the line at all. Rather, 
absolute poverty appears by most accounts to have increased considerably. 
Only in Taiwan do the relative inequality and absolute poverty approaches 
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give similar qualitative assessments. There absolute poverty was reduced 
as the poor shared in economic development. 
Let us now consider some implications of these conclusions. 
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III. Conclusions 
The main lesson from this paper is that in practice as well as in 
theory the choice of a relative inequality or absolute poverty approach 
may make an important qualitative difference in assessing whether economic 
development is benefiting the poor. If one is primarily concerned with 
the alleviation of absolute poverty, it does not seem desirable to use 
relative inequality indices. To the contrary, it is more appropriate 
to use absolute poverty measures such as the number of individuals or 
families with incomes below a constant real poverty line or the average 
gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty line. Depending 
on the type of measure used, the results can look very different. 
It is instructive to analyze why the inequality and poverty measures 
agree qualitatively in Taiwan but not in Brazil and India. The Taiwan 
result is due to a combination of favorable outcomes: (i) The rapid 
growth of the economy and (ii) The decline in relative inequality. 
Taiwan's poor received a larger fraction of a larger total, so their 
absolute incomes unambiguously rose. Brazil, in contrast, satisfied (i) 
but not (ii), i.e., relative inequality increased in a rapidly-growing 
economy. The growth of income more than offset rising inequality, though, 
leading to higher absolute incomes for the poor. In India, however, 
neither (i) nor(ii) held, which may perhaps explain the discrepancy be­
tween some studies which show rising absolute poverty (Bardhan, Ojha, 
Vaidyanathan) and those which report the opposite (Minhas). 
One might speculate that these case studies represent a more general 
relationship between the rate of growth, the nature of growth, and the 
alleviation of poverty: rapid growth seems to reduce poverty unless 
inequality is greatly exacerbated, but poverty is not likely to diminish 
-35-
when growth is lacking. This speculation sounds suspiciously like the 
"grow now, redistribute later" and "trickle down" schools of thought 
of the 1960's. But that is not what I am saying. Rather, I would 
argue that within the existing economic order in a given country, 
and in the absence of major (if not revolutionary) structural change,
,,,,,.,
any economy's distributional rules are more or less fixed. From this, 
it follows that the economic position of the poor will be enhanced 
only when there is more to divide. The contrast between Taiwan and 
India is all too apparent. Alas, non-growth and non-alleviation of 
poverty seem to go hand in hand ••• unless a far-reaching decision is 
made to change the rules for dividing assets, rewarding productive 
factors, and distributing society's goods and services. One dimension 
of that choice is the evenness or unevenness of the growth strategy 
pursued. In this respect, the three countries discussed above differ 
,
importantly. 
Taiwan is reputed to have followed an unusually broadly-based growth 
path, improving the lot of large segments of the rural poor, encouraging 
small-scale industry, etc. 1 India's non-growth was even too, the economic 
lot of the poor rising and falling with the weather and other external 
conditions. In contrast, Brazilian growth seems to have affected relatively 
few: employment in the modern sector and other relatively favorable 
occupations expanded, but only a small proportion of the labor force was 
involved. 2 However, major sectors went nowhere: rural workers' wages 
1 See, for example, Ranis (1974). 
· 
2
See Fields (1977, Table 3) and Morley and Williamson (1975). 
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and the urban minimum wage did not rise and whole regions remained under-
1developed. Perhaps future research will determine if the evenness 
of growth as well as the rate of growth are systematically related to 
the rate of alleviation of poverty and, if such a pattern is found, 
why. 
At issue is a very basic point: what is the ultimate aim of 
economic development studies? I would suggest this question: what 
combinations of circumstances and policies lead •oae countries to up­
grade the economic positions of their poor at faster rates than others? 
The Vi$Wpoint expressed in this pa~r is that studying the magnitudes,, 
and structure of absolute incomes and poverty may be the best way of 
finding out the answers. 
1
See Fishlow (1973a, 1973b). 
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